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The hands are closely tied to language through their role in gestures, sign language, and the 
mirror neuron system for grasping.  Studies within embodied cognition have found that motor 
resonance occurs when people observe graspable objects represented as pictures or words.  
This has led to questions about the influence of the hands on reading.  This experiment 
investigated the effects of the hands on semantic processing.  Participants completed a 
semantic categorization task and a visual task in two different postures: a proximal posture in 
which their hands were near the text, and a distal posture in which their hands were in their 
lap and out of view.  It was hypothesized, in line with previous research, that semantic 
processing would be reduced when the hands were in the proximal posture because of a 
trade-off between semantic and spatial processing.  To the contrary, results showed no effect 
from the hands on semantic processing.  Response times were slower in the proximal posture 
condition than in the distal posture condition of the visual task.  The semantic processing of 
tool words was faster for the proximal posture condition, but this was not significant.  Results 
suggest that the effects of the hands on semantic processing are not robust, and that further 
research is necessary to clarify any influences of the hands on reading.  Future experiments 
on a possible facilitation effect from the hands when semantically processing graspable 
objects would be beneficial in shedding light on the relationship between the hands and 
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The hands and language are uniquely connected.  This relationship has been observed 
in the gestures used by hearing individuals (Goldin-Meadow, 1999), the gestures of children 
during language development (Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 2005), and in the many sign 
languages of the world (Corina, Vaid, & Bellugi, 1992).  The discovery of a mirror neuron 
system for grasping (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998) provides evidence for the interconnectivity of 
the language and motor systems in the brain.   This interconnectivity has become the focal 
point of a new viewpoint within cognitive science: embodied cognition.  Motor resonances 
have been observed not only when people view pictures of graspable objects (Chao &Martin, 
2000), but also when they view words representing objects and actions (Chao, Haxby, 
&Martin, 1999).  If motor resonance is present when reading words, perhaps having one’s 
hands close to words would also have an effect on reading.   
The act of reading has been transformed with the advent of computers, and it is 
becoming more common to read with one’s hands further away from the text.  Despite this 
change, many people still report preferring to print their reading material, without a clearer 
reason other than “I just like to hold it” (Davoli, Du, Montana, Garverick, & Abrams, 2010).  
This intuitive thinking may have some merit if it serves as a cognitive advantage to have 
one’s hands near the text.  If the hands have an effect on semantic processing then it may 
alter our decisions regarding our preferred reading medium.  A study by Davoli et al. (2010) 
found a reduction in semantic processing when one’s hands were near to the text.  The tasks 
in the experiment were questionable, however.  Participants judged the degree of sensibleness 
for a number of sentences, and performed the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) in various postures.  
Both of these tasks presented the possibility for confounding variables, so although Davoli et 
al. (2010) concluded that semantic processing is reduced when one’s hands are near the text, 
it remains unclear if semantic processing was properly measured.   
 This project aims to investigate the relationship between one’s hands and semantic 
processing through an experimental paradigm involving two tasks: a semantic categorization 
task and a visual task.  Chapter one explains the relationship of the hands to language in the 
form of gesture, how the origins of language may be rooted in gesture, and the mirror neuron 
system for grasping.  Chapter two outlines six main claims of embodied cognition and 
evidence for and against these claims.  The third chapter describes the application of 
embodied cognition to studies on vision and language.  Chapter four outlines research on 
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vision and the hands, and the experiments by Davoli et al. (2010).  The experimental design 
is described in chapter five, and the results are presented in chapter six.  Chapter seven 
contains a discussion of the results, an evaluation of the experimental design, ideas for future 
research, and the conclusion. 






Gesture and the Origins of Language 
 
1.1. Gesturing in Humans 
Gestures are a universal human phenomenon.  They accompany speech, occur in early 
childhood, and are a vital form of communication for those with impaired hearing.  Goldin-
Meadow (1999) discussed two forms of gesture: gestures that substitute for speech and 
gestures made by speakers.  Gestures that substitute for speech include “emblems,” such as 
making the “okay” sign by putting one’s thumb and index finger together. Emblems are 
communicative; the individual making them has a communicative intention with the sign that 
is independent from speech.  There are also full sign languages such as ASL (American Sign 
Language) that are structured at morphological, syntactical, and phonological levels and 
show left hemisphere dominance in the same way as spoken languages (Goldin-Meadow, 
1999, p. 420).  Goldin-Meadow (1999) proposed that gestural communication uses 
grammatical structure only when it must bear the full burden of communication.  Gestures 
that accompany speech are generally assumed to reflect the speaker’s emotions and feelings.  
Gestures play a role in speech production even when the gestures are not visible to the 
speaker or the listener, as it has been shown that blind individuals gesture, as do speakers 
when talking on the phone (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008).   
There are two important questions to answer regarding gestures that accompany 
speech: do they communicate the same thing to different addressees, and does the gesture 
communicate what it was intended to communicate?  Gestures accompanying conversation, 
narratives, explanations, and descriptions of objects and actions have all been assigned the 
same meaning by many different independent observers (Goldin-Meadow, 1999, p. 421).  An 
experiment by Garber, Alibali, and Goldin-Meadow (1998) asked children to explain their 
solution to a set of math problems and identified procedures in their solutions that were only 
conveyed through gesture during the child’s explanations.  The children later assessed the 
procedure on a rating task that did not involve any gesturing.  Children rated solutions 
derived from the procedures they conveyed using gestures as more “acceptable” than 
solutions derived from procedures they did not convey.  This experiment showed that gesture 
is a vehicle for expressing knowledge, and that this knowledge is accessible in other tasks 
that do not involve gesture and are not tied to the hands. 
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 Goldin-Meadow (1999) discussed that sign languages differ from spoken languages in 
one important feature: they are spatially expressed.  This distinction could mean that sign 
languages are processed differently in the brain than spoken languages.  Spoken language is 
generally considered to be processed primarily in the left hemisphere, whereas spatial 
processing generally occurs in the right hemisphere.  When an individual has a lesion in the 
left hemisphere, spoken language functioning is often impaired.  If there is a lesion in the 
right hemisphere, it is often spatial processing that suffers.  To investigate whether sign 
language was in a similar area in the brain, experimenters observed if there were the same 
deficits in signers when they had brain lesions.  They found that when brain lesions were in 
the left hemisphere, signers showed language deficits, and when brain lesions were in the 
right hemisphere, they had spatial deficits.  The results matched what was found for speaking 
individuals, and support the theory that signing is processed as linguistic information rather 
than spatial information (Goldin-Meadow, 1999, p. 420).  Emblems and uncommunicative 
hand movements were not processed in the left hemisphere by either signers or speakers, 
implying that signs that are organized around linguistic principles are processed in a way 
more similar to language.  Gestures which form part of an expression of a larger meaning 
therefore depend essentially on left hemisphere mechanisms (Arbib, 2005, p. 160). 
 Young children gesture before they produce speech, and production of gesture-plus-
word combinations (such as pointing at a cup while saying the word “cup”) tend to precede 
two-word combinations (Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 2005).  Iverson and Goldin-Meadow 
(2005) explored whether the gestures children use to refer to specific objects are related to the 
emergence of verbal labels for objects and whether the production of gesture-plus-word 
combinations has a relation to the emergence of two-word utterances (p. 367).  They studied 
ten children making the transition from one-word to two-word utterances and found that 
many of the lexical items the children produced in gesture first quickly became part of their 
verbal lexicon.  Also, children that were first to create gesture-plus-word combinations were 
first to create two-word combinations.  These observations revealed that changes in gesture 
not only predate language but also predict changes in language.  Gesture, therefore, plays a 
crucial role in language development.    
 
1.2. Gestural Origins of Language Evolution 
It has been hypothesized that the emergence of language came at some point about 
50,000 years ago at the same time of the first archaeological discoveries of art and burial 
5 
 
rituals (Arbib, 2005).  Arbib (2005) argues that Homo sapiens were “language ready” and 
that language formed as a way for humans to transfer skills needed to master human 
technology.  Once the human brain was “language ready,” humans transferred skills and 
information through cultural transmission, which works on time scales many orders of 
magnitude faster than organic evolution (Tomasello, 1999, p. 4).  If this is the case, how did 
humans evolve a “language ready” brain?  Arbib (2005) promotes the hypothesis that a form 
of “protosign” provided essential scaffolding for the emergence of “protospeech.” Arbib 
(2005) argues that during the biological and cultural evolution along the hominid line, 
advances were made to both protosign and protospeech and that they fed off of each other in 
an expanding spiral.  As a result of this interaction, protosign was not able to achieve the 
status of a full language prior to the emergence of early forms of protospeech (Arbib, 2005, p. 
148).   
 
1.2.1. Definitions of Protolanguage 
Arbib (2005) defines “protosign” as protolanguage communicated primarily through 
manual and facial gestures, and “protospeech” as protolanguage communicated primarily 
though vocal gestures.  Arbib’s (2005) notion of protolanguage differs from the definition 
given by Bickerton (1995).  Bickerton (1995) defines protolanguage as a form of 
communication that is made up of utterances with a few lexical items but without syntactic 
structure.  The definition can be applied to pidgins, infant language, and “languages” taught 
to apes (Arbib, 2005, p. 148).  Bickerton (1995) proposed a hypothesis of language evolution 
in which Homo erectus spoke a form of protolanguage and that the evolution of Universal 
Grammar caused protolanguage to evolve into language.  Contrary to Bickerton (1995), 
Arbib (2005) believes that the human brain was “language ready” and that language evolved 
holistically in that the protolanguage spoken by humans began as unitary utterances that 
would be expressed with a number of words if it were translated into modern-day language.  
Syntax and words evolved culturally according to Arbib (2005) through a process called 
fractionation.   During fractionation the larger utterances of protolanguage were replaced by 
semantically smaller units, and grammatical rules emerged to help clarify the structure.   
 
1.2.2. The Mirror System Hypothesis 
Arbib (2005) proposed a Mirror System Hypothesis based on experimental findings 
that a mirror system in area F5 of the macaque premotor cortex links observation and 
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execution of manual actions (p. 149).  The F5 area is homologous to the Broca’s area of the 
human brain.  The Mirror System Hypothesis states that the parity requirement, or what 
counts for the speaker must count in relatively the same way for the hearer, is met because 
the Broca’s area evolved on top of a mirror system for grasping with its capacity to generate 
and recognize a set of actions (Arbib, 2005, p. 149).  The processes concerning the 
production of word sounds is located primarily in the Broca’s area in the brain, whereas 
processes concerning the recognition of word sounds is located primarily in the Wernicke’s 
area (Arbib, 2005).  Arbib (2005) notes that despite the hypothesis being Broca’s-centric, 
there are interactions between several areas within the brain in the monkey including between 
the parietal (PF), temporal (STS), and premotor (F5) and that these findings “provide an 
evolutionary basis for the integration of Wernike’s area, STS and Broca’s area in the human” 
(p. 150).   The Mirror System Hypothesis uses neurological findings to support the claim that 
hand movements were fundamental for the evolution of language.   
Arbib (2005) defined seven stages of the evolution of language to explain how the 
mirror system for grasping observed in monkeys could be central to the evolution to human 
language (Arbib, 2005, p.150):  
 
Stage 1: Grasping. 
Stage 2: A mirror system for grasping shared with the common ancestor of human and 
monkey. 
Stage 3: A simple imitation system for grasping shared with common ancestor of 
human and chimpanzee. 
Stage 4: A complex imitation system for grasping. 
Stage 5: Protosign, a manual-based communication system, breaking through the 
fixed repertoire of primate vocalizations to yield an open repertoire. 
Stage 6: Protospeech, resulting from the ability of control mechanisms evolved for 
protosign coming to control the vocal apparatus with increasing flexibility. 
Stage 7: Language: the change from action-object frames to verb-argument structures 
to syntax and semantics; the historical (rather than biological) co-evolution of 
cognitive and linguistic complexity.  
 
The evolution from a simple system for grasping to the development of imitation is 
important in explaining advanced communication systems such as language because imitation 
is a uniquely human ability.  It is generally accepted that monkeys have a very limited 
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capacity for imitation, though further study is still needed (Arbib, 2003).  Apes are, however, 
adept at tool use (Mulcahy & Call, 2006; Tomasello, 1999; Breuer, Ndoundou-Hockemba, & 
Fishlock, 2006).  Although chimpanzees (and likely the other ape species as well) are very 
good at learning about the dynamic affordances of objects, they are not very good at learning 
a new behavioral strategy from others (Tomasello, 1999).  Whereas human children will 
imitate an adult even if their method is less efficient at achieving a goal, a chimpanzee will 
ignore any demonstration and attempt the route they see as most efficient (Nagell, Olguin, 
and Tomasello, 1993).  
The form of imitative learning observed in children is important for the cultural 
transmission of information (Tomasello, 1999).  The development of a complex imitation 
system for hand movements may have been adaptive in supporting an increased transfer of 
manual skills and therefore likely preceded the evolution of protolanguage in whatever 
modality (Arbib, 2005, p.157).  According to Arbib (2005), “protosign exploits the ability for 
complex imitation of hand movements in order to adapt this imitation to the needs of 
communication, and that the resulting protosign provides scaffolding for protospeech but that 
both develop together thereafter” (p. 158).   
 
1.3. Mirror Neurons 
Mirror neurons were first discovered in the monkey brain (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998).  
These neurons discharged not only when monkeys performed the action of grasping an 
object, but also when they observed a human or other monkey grasping an object. Mirror 
neurons discharged only when the monkey observed another individual reaching for an 
object, but not when the individual was making the same movement with no object present.  
This ‘observation/execution matching system’ is referred to by Arbib (2003) as the mirror 
system for grasping.  The mirror neurons that discharged in the monkey brain were located in 
area F5, the rostral part of the monkey ventral premotor cortex (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998).  
This area is the monkey homolog of Broca’s area in the human brain.  Broca’s area is an 
important language area of the brain, especially for speech.  Lesions in this area lead to 
Broca’s Aphasia.  Positron emission tomography (PET) data has revealed that Broca’s area 
also becomes active during the execution of hand and arm movements, during mental 
imagery of hand grasping movement, and during tasks involving hand-mental rotations 
(Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998).   
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Rizzolatti et al. (1996) conducted a study to determine if there were mirror neurons in 
the human brain that also discharged when grasping an object or observing another person 
grasping an object.  They compared three experimental conditions: object observation 
(control condition); grasping observation (participant observed someone else grasp an 
object); and object prehension (the participant grasped the object).  They found that in 
humans the Broca’s region was activated in both the execution and observation of grasping.  
This overlap of the language centers of the brain and the location of mirror neurons for 
grasping supports the theory proposed by Arbib (2003) that the capacity for language may 
have evolved out of this original mirror system for grasping.  Both the F5 and Broca’s areas 
have neural structures that control oro-laryngeal, oro-facial, and brachio-manual movements, 
and they both are endowed with mechanisms that link action perception and action 
production (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998, p. 192).  A manual gestural system may have evolved 
out of exploiting this mirror system for grasping, and paved the way for an open vocalization 
system now known as speech (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998).   
The fact that part of the mirror system is located in a speech area may also provide a 
mechanism mediating motor resonance in reading (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008, pp 830-831).  
Mirror neurons still discharge even when there is some degree of abstraction away from 
visually given information.  For example, mirror neurons are activated by actions towards 
hidden objects as long as the monkey knows that they are present (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008, p. 
829).  Mirror neurons in the monkey generally respond only to transitive (object-related) acts 
but not intransitive (gestural) acts (Corballis, 2010, p. 25).  Humans, in contrast, have mirror 
neurons that respond both to transitive and intransitive acts, which may have evolved as a 
way to comprehend symbolic acts as well as those that are object-related (Fadiga, Fogassi, 
Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995).  Even static images that only implied an action triggered mirror 
neurons in humans (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008).  A study by Nishitani and Hari (2002) found 
that watching photographs of a person adopting different lip postures triggered a series of 
activation in successive processing stages in the brains of viewers.  These activations were 
very similar for both the passive viewing and active imitation conditions (Fischer & Zwaan, 
2008).   
Buccino et al. (2005) discovered that mirror neuron resonance for oral communication 
in humans is limited to conspecifics.  Participants in the study viewed videos of different 
animals performing mouth-related actions: humans lip-reading, monkeys lip smacking, and 
dogs barking.  They found an overall reduction of brain activity in the frontal operculum with 
the most activation occurring when viewing humans, decreased activation when viewing 
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monkeys, and no activation when viewing dogs.  It seems, therefore, that mirror neurons are 
active only when an observer is able to match the observed action with his or her own action 
repertoire1
The discovery of mirror neurons provides evidence that our hands, and body, may 
play an important role in higher levels of cognition, from imitation to language.  This 
discovery has led to broader research on the relationship between the body and higher 
cognitive processes.  These new areas of research are centered on the concept of embodied 
cognition.   




                                                     
1 Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, and Haggard (2005) found higher levels of motor area brain 
activity in dancers when they observed movements that were part of their dance repertoire.  Further research by 
Cross, Hamilton, and Grafton (2007) found a positive correlation between perceived motor expertise and 
activation in brain areas involved in both action observation and simulation in participants trained to perform 






2.1. A New Viewpoint 
Traditionally within cognitive science the mind has been viewed as an abstract 
information processor. The mind’s connection to the outside world has been seen as having 
little theoretical importance (Wilson, 2002).  It was not considered relevant to study 
perceptual and motor systems to understand central cognitive processes (Wilson, 2002, p. 
625).  Experiments tended to limit sensory and motor processing in order to isolate central 
cognitive processes of interest (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008).  Recent studies of the influence of 
motor activity on higher level cognition gained much attention in a research community 
interested in a broader understanding of human cognition. This research presented the 
possibility that language comprehension may involve or be influenced by components of the 
motor system.  These components, known as “motor resonances” may even be required for 
language to function properly (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008).  A notion central to the idea of 
embodied cognition is that cognition is grounded in perception and action.  The viewpoint of 
embodied cognition states that cognitive processes have their roots in the body’s interactions 
with the world (Wilson, 2002, p. 265).  Both the perceptual processes that feed into cognition 
and the actions selected by and guided through cognition are essential to our understanding of 
cognition as a whole (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008).    
 
2.2. The Six Claims of Embodied Cognition 
Wilson (2002) distinguished six claims made by researchers regarding embodied 
cognition.  Some of the six claims are more controversial than others.  This chapter draws 
heavily from Wilson’s (2002) review of the main views of embodied cognition.   
 
2.2.1. Claim 1: Cognition is Situated 
The claim that cognition is situated is the idea that cognitive activity takes place 
within the context of a real-world environment, and therefore inherently involves both 
perception and action (Wilson, 2002, p. 626).  Wilson (2002) states that situated cognition is 
cognition that occurs in the context of task-relevant inputs and outputs.  During cognitive 
processing, perceptual information and motor activity continues to affect processing and the 
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environment in ways that are task-relevant.  Some examples of situated cognition are driving, 
holding a conversation, or walking around a room imagining how to reposition the furniture 
(Wilson, 2002, p. 626).  These are examples of “on-line” cognition, because there is task-
relevant input and output involved.  “Off-line” refers to cognition that takes place in the 
absence of task-relevant input and output, and is therefore not situated.  Examples of non-
situated cognition are planning, remembering, and day-dreaming within contexts that are not 
directly relevant to plans, memories, or day-dreams (Wilson, 2002, p. 626).   
A common argument is that situated cognition played an important role in our 
evolutionary history (Wilson, 2002).  This argument states that before civilization, the 
survival value of mental abilities was based on the usefulness of these abilities in situations 
that demanded immediate responses, such as avoiding predators and obtaining food.  
According to Wilson (2002), this argument tends to overlook the importance of off-line 
cognition for our survival, and it may overemphasize the importance of on-line cognition.  
For example, hunting for food came later in human evolution.  Before hunting, humans 
mostly relied on gathering for food.  The act of gathering food would likely involve off-line 
cognition because it would involve remembering the terrain and the impact of the weather.  
Situated cognition would be useful during the actual act of gathering, but whether it would be 
necessary to have more advanced abilities than any foraging animal is questionable.  Skills 
for avoiding predators such as the fight-or-flight response are ubiquitous among animal 
species, so it remains unclear how much extra benefit situated cognition would have provided 
for humans that would distinguish them significantly from other animals.   It is likely that off-
line preventative and communication measures were increasingly used by humans to avoid 
predators. Wilson (2002) argues that focusing too much on situated cognition could detract 
from these species-defining features of human cognition.   
Barsalou (1999a) argues that language was originally used by early humans for 
immediate, situated, indexical purposes.  Language could have been used to describe where 
prey was found, procedures for hunting them, and assigning hunting roles (Barsalou, 1999a, 
p. 65).  Barsalou (1999a) states that even information about the past or future, such as 
describing good hunting terrain, is still related to situated uses of language because it could 
become relevant on later occasions.  For example, if an adult described the location of a cave 
to a child it may not have immediate use, but perhaps on a different occasion the child may 
need to seek shelter from a storm and remember the cave.  In this situation, the stored 
information serves situated action (Barsalou, 1999a, p. 66).   
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Wilson (2002) argues that some of the examples of situated language given by 
Barsalou (1999a), such as relaying hunting terrain information, are not actually examples of 
situated uses of language.  In fact, although the example of providing information to a child 
about a cave could become useful in a situated circumstance, it is not a situated use of 
language in itself.  According to Wilson (2002), off-line functions of language were likely 
also used early on in human evolution.  Some examples of early off-line functions of 
language could include: absorbing parental edicts about avoiding certain behaviors, deciding 
on a planned activity such as going to the river to cool off, and remembering instructions for 
materials to fetch for tool manufacturing (Wilson, 2002, p. 627).   Once the representational 
capacity of language emerged, one would expect that the full capacity of language—both 
situated and non-situated use—would be utilized.  The claim for the centrality of situated 
cognition is not strongly persuasive, Wilson (2002) argues, due to the vast number of 
exceptions that are equally important to the understanding of human cognition.   
 
2.2.2. Claim 2: Cognition is Time Pressured 
 According to Wilson (2002), the claim that cognition is time pressured is based on the 
observation that situated cognition must cope in “real time.”  In contrast to traditional 
artificial intelligence models which generally build up and manipulate internal 
representations of a situation without any time pressure, an animal in a real environment does 
not have this luxury.  Rather, an animal must cope with predators, prey, terrain and objects in 
its environment as quickly as possible in order to survive.  Time pressure is thought to be 
important to cognition because it causes a “representational bottleneck.” In a time-pressured 
environment, it may not be possible to build up a complete mental model of the environment.  
Instead it could require the organism to use cheap and efficient tricks for generating situation-
appropriate action on the spot.  This compromise that the organism must make could have 
far-reaching consequences for cognitive architecture (Wilson, 2002, p. 628).  Wilson (2002) 
states that the force of this argument rests upon the assumption that animals and humans have 
evolved so that they can overcome this representational bottleneck and are capable of 
functioning “normally” in time-pressured situations (p. 628).  However, many times humans 
are not successful in coping with the representational bottleneck.  The vast majority of our 
daily tasks are not time pressured, and it is only certain specific tasks, such as changing lanes 
in heavy traffic, that involve the representational bottleneck.  Despite this fact, there are still 
many domains, such as perceptuomotor coordination, that function in “real time.”  Skilled 
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hand movements, such as the manipulation of objects in the environment, are an example of a 
time-locked perceptuomotor activity (Wilson, 2002, p. 628).  Nevertheless, it is hard to 
generalize that all forms of cognition are time pressured. 
 
2.2.3. Claim 3: Cognitive Work is Off-Loaded to the Environment 
This claim states that we tend to exploit the environment in order to reduce cognitive 
workload due to limits on our information-processing abilities (Wilson, 2002).  Although we 
use off-line cognition, sometimes we are forced to function on-line.  Wilson (2002) describes 
two types of strategies used to cope with the representational bottleneck.  The first is relying 
on preloaded representations that were acquired through prior learning.  In the case of novel 
tasks, cognitive workload can be reduced by using the environment itself in strategic ways 
rather than fully encoding it.  This strategy also includes using epistemic actions to change 
the environment to reduce the remaining cognitive workload.  These strategies are used not 
only in time pressure situations but also for tasks that can be taxing for attention and working 
memory.  Off-loading seems to be particularly useful for spatial tasks, but it can also apply to 
a wide range of different cognitive tasks, such as doing math with a pencil and paper and 
counting on one’s fingers.  In these situations, the cognitive system is exploiting 
environmental resources to gain knowledge that will be useful at a later time, if at all.  
Symbolic off-loading on to the environment does not need to be formalized and can even be 
applied to gesturing while speaking.  Research has shown that gesturing while speaking helps 
the thought process of the speaker, besides being communicative (Goldin-Meadow, 1999).   
 
2.2.4. Claim 4: The Environment is Part of the Cognitive System 
The claim that the environment is part of the cognitive system is based on the insight 
that the body and environment play a role in assisting cognitive processing (Wilson, 2002, p. 
629).  The viewpoint is that cognition is not merely a mind activity but instead is distributed 
across the mind, body, and environment.  It is therefore necessary to not just study the 
individual, but the situation as well, as a single, unified system.  According to Wilson (2002), 
a system is defined as a collection of elements that stand in some relation to one another, and 
these elements must have properties that are affected by their participation in a system.  An 
example would be the automobile, in which the individual parts help make the whole.  There 
can also be open systems, such as the solar system, in which a part such as the sun can be 
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looked at individually and as one element of a system.  Therefore the definition of a system is 
largely dependent on one’s analysis.   
A system is defined by organization, or the functional relations among its elements.  
Systems are either facultative or obligate. Those that are facultative are temporary systems 
that are organized briefly and disbanded readily.  Obligate systems are, for the most part, 
permanent systems in regards to the lifetime of their parts.  If the environment is to be 
included in a cognitive system, then the elements of the system would change in each new 
situation, constituting a facultative system.  New facultative systems would have to occur for 
each new situation that a person encounters throughout each day.  The cognitive architecture 
of an individual mind, however, would be considered an obligate system, since the different 
components of the brain retain their functional roles over time.  Although the mind is open in 
regards to its environment, it does not compromise the mind’s status as a system any more 
than it would compromise the status of a hydrogen atom or ecosystem.  Thus, according to 
Wilson (2002), the claim that the environment is also part of the cognitive system does not 
hold up.   
 
2.2.5. Claim 5: Cognition is for Action 
This claim states that the main function of the mind is to guide action, and that 
perception and memory must be studied in light of their contribution to situation-appropriate 
behavior (Wilson, 2002, p. 626).  This claim has gained support from research on perception 
and memory.  In studies on vision, the ventral visual pathway has traditionally been viewed 
as the “what” pathway because it generates representations of object structure.  The dorsal 
visual pathway has been viewed as the “where” pathway traditionally, because it generates 
representations of spatial relationships.  However, more recently it has been argued that the 
dorsal stream should be thought of as a “how” pathway, because its proposed function is to 
serve visually guided actions such as reaching and grasping (Wilson, 2002, p. 631).  Some 
support has been found for this claim in studies that demonstrate that visual input can prime 
motor activity.  One study by Craighero, Fadiga, Umiltà, and Rizzolatti (1996) found that 
viewing a rectangle of a particular orientation provided performance facilitation on a 
subsequent grasping task if the objects being grasped shared the same orientation2
                                                     
2 A priming effect was found even when the orientation of the rectangle did not predict the orientation of the 
object to be grasped (Wilson, 2002).   
.  The 
discovery of neurons in the brains of monkeys that discharge when observing tools 
(Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Gallese, 1996) is also supportive of the claim that “vision has 
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its evolutionary rationale rooted in improved motor control” (Churchland, Ramachandran, & 
Sjenowski, 1994, p. 25).  Researchers studying the processes of memory storage have also 
proposed that memory should be viewed as “encoding patterns of possible physical 
interaction with a three-dimensional world” (Glenberg, 1997, p. 1).  This viewpoint on 
memory may help to explain formal and informal observations that we conceptualize objects 
and situations in terms of their functional relevance, rather than neutrally or objectively 
(Wilson, 2002).   
Despite these studies and observations, there are many more situations in which 
vision and memory do not have an obvious link to the motor system.  Wilson (2002) states 
that visual events such as viewing sunsets, observing human faces, and reading are all 
examples of visual situations in which there is almost non-existent physical interaction.  
Some broader functions of memory are also not easily encompassed in the claim that their 
main function is to guide action.  For example, mental concepts (such as the knowledge that a 
mutilated dollar bill is still a dollar bill but a counterfeit one is not) “do not always or even 
usually follow physical concrete properties that lend themselves to action, but instead often 
involve intangible properties based on folk-scientific theories or knowledge of causal history” 
(Wilson, 2002, p.632).  Although mental representations can be incomplete and sketchy, 
especially when only given brief exposure to a novel object or situation, humans are able to 
build up strong mental representations if given time and exposure.  Wilson (2002) therefore 
concludes that our mental representations are largely purpose-neutral, based on the fact that 
they tend to contain information beyond what was needed for their originally conceived 
purpose.  This is arguably an adaptive cognitive strategy, because it provides “an enormous 
advantage in problem-solving flexibility over a creature that encodes purely in terms of 
presently foreseeable activities” (Wilson, 2002, p. 632). 
 
2.2.6. Claim 6: Off-Line Cognition Is Body Based  
The last main claim used by proponents of the theory of embodied cognition is that 
even with decoupling from the environment, the activity of the mind is grounded in 
mechanisms that evolved for interaction with the environment (Wilson, 2002).  Those 
mechanisms are sensory processing and motor control.  Wilson (2002) states that many 
abstract cognitive processes utilize mental structures originally evolved for perception and 
action.  These mental structures are co-opted to run off-line, decoupled from their original 
purpose, to help with abstract thought.  Evidence for this occurring has appeared in research 
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on many different aspects of higher-level cognition.  Studies on mental imagery have found 
that mental imagery uses “analogue representations that functionally preserve spatial and 
other properties of the external world, rather than consisting of bundles of propositions” 
(Wilson, 2002, p. 633).   
The use of sensory and motor control mechanisms in memory processes have been 
observed in studies on working memory, episodic memory, and implicit memory.  In working 
memory, effects have been observed on phonological similarity (worse memory for words 
that sound alike), articulatory suppression (worse memory if the relevant articulatory muscles 
are kept busy with another activity such as repeating a nonsense word), and word length 
(worse memory for long words) (Wilson, 2002, p. 633).  Some interesting studies by Wilson 
and Emmorey (1997, 1998) found that similar effects but with a different sensorimotor 
modality have been observed in deaf subjects when using sign language.  They found that 
performance drops when participants must perform a repetitive movement with their hands 
while trying to remember signs, or when the signs they must remember have similar hand 
shapes or are temporally long.  Speech perception and production areas of the brain are also 
involved during working memory rehearsal (Wilson, 2001).  It seems, therefore, that working 
memory performs a form of off-loading on to the “environment” as discussed earlier in the 
third claim, but in these cases working memory does not off-load onto the environment itself, 
but instead onto systems that interact with the environment: the perceptual and motor control 
systems of the brain (Wilson, 2002).   
Studies in episodic memory have also shown that long-term memory has links to our 
body’s interactions with the world (Wilson, 2002).  For example, episodic memories contain 
records of spatiotemporally localized events, as experienced by the person remembering 
them.  When memories are fresh in one’s mind, there is a quality of “reliving” in which the 
visual, kinesthetic, and spatial impressions are recalled.  Implicit memory also seems to be 
embodied.  Implicit memory is the way in which skills are learned, to the point that they 
become automatic, when previously they required attention and effort.  Wilson (2002) 
explains that in a sense, implicit memory can be seen as off-loading some of the problems 
that confront the situated cognizer.  Once skills are automatized, the cognitive load is 
reduced, circumventing the representational bottleneck.  Highly automatized tasks allow for 
more opportunities for fine-tuned control of action, as well as more robust and stable internal 
representations of the situation (Wilson, 2002, p. 634).   
Studies have also shown that reasoning and problem-solving heavily use sensorimotor 
stimulation.  According to Wilson (2002), problem solving is improved with the help of 
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mental models.  Within the field of cognitive linguistics, a new approach is emerging in 
contrast with the formal and abstract syntactic structures of traditional theories (e.g., 
Langacker, 1987, 1991; Talmy, 2000).  The approach posits that syntax is deeply tied to 
semantics.  This relationship between syntax and semantics is due in part to “image schemas 
that represent embodied knowledge of the physical world” (Wilson, 2002, p. 634).  Within an 
image schema, perceptual principles such as attentional focus and figure/ground segregation 
are used as a way to encode grammatical relations between different items.   
Another example of embodied cognition within reasoning and problem-solving is an 
embodied approach to explaining mental concepts.  Although it is problematic to explain 
mental concepts purely by sensorimotor patterns, Wilson (2002) explains that it is possible 
that mental concepts have been built up out of cognitive primitives that are sensorimotor in 
nature (see Barsalou, 1999b; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999).  Lastly, Wilson (2002) 
proposes that motoric simulation may play a role in representing and understanding the 
behavior of conspecifics.  The mental simulation of something that is imitatible “can be 
mapped isomorphically onto one’s own body” (Wilson, 2002, p. 634).  This is seen in 
research on mirror neurons (Arbib, 2003) and is important for predicting, imitating, and 
understanding the behavior of other conspecifics.   
These claims show that embodied cognition does not represent one viewpoint, but 
instead a number of different views, each with their own problems and merits.  Certain claims 
have been readily applied to research on vision and language, both of which play an 




Embodied Cognition in Vision and Language  
 
3.1. Embodied Cognition Claims for Vision and Language 
The theory of embodied cognition has been applied to research on vision and 
sensorimotor interactions.  Relationships between language and the sensorimotor system have 
been found, providing support for the embodiment of language.  These studies have 
supported many of the common embodied cognition claims; most commonly the first claim, 
that cognition is situated, and the sixth claim, that off-line cognition is body-based.  Situated 
cognition can be observed in studies of affordance effects and motor resonance for action 
observation.  The sixth claim, that off-line cognition is grounded in interactions with the 
environment, can be observed in studies of motor resonance and language comprehension.  
Motor resonance has also been observed in studies on lexical access.  The empirical evidence 
for embodied cognition is mounting, and research within vision and language is revealing an 
overlap with the motor and premotor systems. 
 
3.2. Mechanisms of Action Simulation 
There are two candidate mechanisms involved in action simulation: the computation 
of affordances during object recognition and motor resonance during action observation 
(Fischer & Zwaan, 2008, p. 831).  Studies have found an interaction between these 
mechanisms and language comprehension.  Affordances are defined as “a feature of an object 
with the power to elicit some form of mental representation for action with a perceiver” 
(Phillips & Ward, 2002, p. 541).  Phillips and Ward (2002) conducted a study to measure 
whether the action representation evoked by viewing a visual affordance causes a specific 
motor response bias for the limb that is most suited to perform the afforded action (p. 555).  
Participants had to respond with speeded left-right button presses in response to an 
imperative target superimposed onto a prime image of an object that suggested a visual 
affordance that was either oriented to left or right visual space.  An example of a prime image 
used was a frying pan with the handle facing to the left or the right.  They found 
corresponding effects between the suggested affordance of the prime and the side of 
response.  They found little effect of modality (hands uncrossed, hands crossed, or foot 
response).  These findings suggest that the motor system uses object information to compute 
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possible actions based on one’s current posture in order to select favorable responses (Fischer 
& Zwaan, 2008, p. 831).   
Flanagan and Johansson (2003) tested the hypothesis that action understanding is a 
result of a mechanism that maps an observed action onto motor representations of that action 
(p. 769).  One way to test this hypothesis was to have participants observe a block stacking 
task and to record their gaze and hand movements.  Task-specific proactive eye movements 
have been found to be crucial for control and planning when performing visually guided 
actions.  The direct matching hypothesis predicts that participants will make the same eye 
movements when observing visually guided actions as they do when performing those 
actions.  Flanagan and Johansson (2003) found that when participants observed block 
stacking, the coordination between the block-stacker’s hand and their gaze was predictive 
rather than reactive, and it was highly similar to the gaze-hand coordination when they 
themselves perform the task.  The results supported the direct matching hypothesis because 
they indicate that participants implement eye motor programs directed by motor 
representations of manual actions during action observation (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003, p. 
769).  The results are also in line with predictive coding and forward models of cognition 
(Friston, 2010; Grush, 2004).   
 
3.3. Motor Processes and Language Comprehension 
Fischer and Zwaan (2008) explain that there are two types of motor resonance that 
can occur during language comprehension.  The first type, communicative motor resonance, 
occurs when the motor system responds to the communicative act itself.  An example of 
communicative motor resonance would be a listener’s speech motor system responding to 
hearing the word “kick,” because the motor system is simulating the speech production of the 
utterance.  The second type is known as referential motor resonance, and it occurs “when the 
motor system responds to the content of the communication” (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008, p. 
837).  An example of this type would be when the listener’s leg area of the premotor cortex 
responds to hearing the word “kick.”  In this example the motor system is simulating the 
action described by the utterance instead of the production of the utterance itself.  Fischer and 
Zwaan (2008) speculate that the communicative resonance is helpful in anticipating what the 
speaker is going to say next, and referential resonance is helpful in informing the 
comprehender about what is going to happen next in the described situation. Both of these 
forms of motor resonance play a role in language comprehension.   
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Communicative resonance occurs most obviously in phonological processing.  A 
study by Fadiga, Craighero, Buccino, and Rizzolatti (2002) found that muscle evoked 
potentials (MEPs) measured from muscles were significantly larger for Italian participants 
when they listened to pseudowords that contained a tongue-trilled double-r sound than when 
they listened to pseudowords that contained a non-trilled double-f sound.  The results showed 
that listening to linguistic information activates speech production motor resonances.  The 
finding that MEPs are significantly larger when participants listen to linguistic information 
requiring tongue movement during production is an example of communicative motor 
resonance.  
 
3.4. Motor Resonance and Lexical Access 
The other form of motor resonance, referential motor resonance, is more relevant for 
this experiment and for the vast majority of studies on motor resonance and lexical access.  
Studies have shown that reading single words can evoke motor representations.  Research by 
Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani, Daprati, and Gangitano (2000) found that visuo-motor 
transformation was influenced by automatic word reading.  For the first two experiments, 
participants grasped an object that was either near or far from the participant and was labeled 
either the Italian word “VICINO” (near) or “LONTAN” (far).  During further experiments 
participants grasped a small or large object labeled with the words “PICCOLO” (small) or 
“GRANDE” (large), and a high or low object labeled with the words “ALTO” (high) or 
“BASSO” (low).  The meaning of the printed words affected the kinematics of the initial 
phase of reaching-grasping.  For example, the maximum grip aperture was larger for objects 
with the word “GRANDE” (large) printed on them than for objects with the word 
“PICCOLO” (small) printed on them.  Participants automatically associated the meaning of 
the word with the corresponding property of the object and their reach and/or grasp program 
was influenced by the word (Gentilucci et al., 2000, p. 468)3
In a further experiment they replaced the adjectives with adverbs
.   
4
                                                     
3 They did not find this effect in the control experiment that used word meanings that corresponded to a property 
of the object indirectly involved in reach control (the object’s color).   
. They found that 
the adjectives had a larger influence on visual analysis of the target object properties, whereas 
adverbs had a more direct influence on the control of the action.  Gentilucci et al. (2000) 
observed that these effects resembled the structure of a sentence in that adjectives often refer 
4 “ALTO” (high) and “BASSO” (low) were replaced with Italian adverbs “SOPRA” (up) and “SOTTO” (down).   
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to nouns, and adverbs often refer to verbs.  Thus, the word class, and even in a broad sense 
grammar, has an influence on motor control.  According to Gentilucci et al. (2000), previous 
neurophysiological and neuropsychological research indicates that Broca’s area in the brain is 
involved in analysis of grammar rules.  The involvement of Broca’s area in both language 
and the mirror system for grasping could help to explain the results of the Gentilucci et al. 
(2000) study.  Gentilucci et al. (2000) hypothesized that, during the task in their study, the 
process of visuo-motor transformation for reaching and/or grasping an object caused the 
activation of an automatic process of reading and internal repetition of the words printed on 
the objects.  This could be represented as “simultaneous activation of processes of 
transformation of visual information into motor commands for both hand and mouth” 
(Gentilucci et al., 2000, p. 489).  Then, a visual analysis of the target object could be inferred 
by a semantic analysis of the word. 
Glover (2004) sought to further understand the effects of words on action throughout 
the course of movement; testing specifically the planning-control model regarding semantic 
effects (p. 15).  The planning-control model proposed by Glover (2004) states that there are 
two different overlapping systems involved in the process of selecting and executing body 
movements. The model predicts that prior to the movement’s initiation, a motor program is 
selected based on many cognitive factors including a “planning” system in the inferior 
parietal lobe.  During the execution of the movement, the action becomes increasingly under 
the control of a different system, the “control” system, using a “limited but quickly updated 
visual representation in the super parietal lobe” (Glover, 2004, p. 3).  According to the 
planning-control model, cognitive processes such as semantics should affect how a 
movement is planned, but not how the movement is controlled on-line.   If it is the case that 
the effect observed by Gentilucci et al. (2000) is due to an semantic influence on planning, 
then one would expect to find a the largest effect early in the movement but a decrease in 
effect as the hand approaches the target.  Glover (2004) conducted a similar study using the 
English words “LARGE” and “SMALL” and measured the grip aperture early in the reach 
for objects and later in the reach for objects.  They found participants had stronger grip 
aperture in the reach for objects on which “LARGE” was printed compared to objects labeled 
“SMALL” but that these effects faded as the hand approached the object (Glover, 2004).  In 
another experiment, Glover (2004) found that the same effect could be obtained if the 
participants read a word and then grasped an object.  Words represented either relatively 
large objects such as “APPLE” or “BASEBALL” or relatively smaller objects such as 
“GRAPE” or “PEA.”  Participants had larger grip apertures after reading larger object words, 
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but this effect faded as the hand approached its target.  These two experiments provided 
support for the planning-control model.   
Although these studies show support for motor resonance in planning tasks, they do 
not show whether it still occurs in a task that is not based on planning (Fischer & Zwaan, 
2008).  Experiments conducted by Tucker and Ellis (2004) investigated the priming of visual 
objects on actions.  Their experiments tested whether different types of hand postures 
afforded by objects became activated by exposure to associated words (Fischer & Zwaan, 
2008, p.838).  Participants made judgments about whether objects were natural or manmade 
by responding with either a precision grip or a power grasp.  A response compatibility effect 
was found.   Tucker and Ellis (2004) also found that precision grips were faster for objects 
that would require a precision grip and power grasps were faster for objects that would 
require a power grasp.  They conducted a further experiment in which the pictures of the 
objects were replaced by words for the same objects.  They found no difference in effects 
when using words instead of pictures.   
Studies have shown that specific classes of objects such as tools differentially activate 
the left middle temporal gyrus, which also becomes activated by action generation tasks, and 
the left premotor cortex, which is also activated when a person imagines themselves grasping 
objects with their dominant hand (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008, p. 839).  Martin, Wiggs, 
Ungerleider, and Haxby (1996) investigated the neural correlates of a dissociation caused by 
brain damage to the human brain that results in selective loss of knowledge about a specific 
category of objects.  They used PET to map regions of the normal brain that are associated 
with naming animals and tools.   Participants viewed drawings of animals and tools and 
named the objects silently during one scan and aloud during another scan5
                                                     
5 Participants were also scanned twice while staring at visual noise patterns and twice while staring at novel 
nonsense objects.   
.  The naming of 
pictures and tools was associated with bilateral activation of the ventral temporal lobes and 
Broca’s area.  The medial occipital lobe – a brain region involved in the earliest stages of 
visual processing – was also activated when participants named pictures of animals. In 
contrast, naming tools selectively activated a left premotor area that is also activated by 
imagined hand movements.  An area in the left middle temporal gyrus that becomes activated 
by the generation of action words was also activated by tool words.  Martin et al. (1996) 
concluded that the brain regions active when identifying objects are dependent to some 
degree on the intrinsic properties of the object presented (p. 649).   
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 Another study by Chao and Martin (2000) used functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) to observe the neural response in frontal and parietal cortices associated with 
viewing and naming objects of different categories (p.478).  They predicted that pictures of 
tools would elicit activity in regions of the brain that store information about motor-based 
properties because, in comparison to other objects, tools are highly manipulable objects 
associated with hand movements.  The object categories used were tools, animals, faces, and 
houses, presented as black-and-white photographs.  Chao and Martin (2000) found that the 
ventral premotor cortex was selectively activated when participants viewed and named 
pictures of tools.  This area that responded selectively to tools is the homolog of the monkey 
canonical F5 area, an area that also discharges in the monkey when they view graspable 
objects, even without any subsequent motor activity.  Chao and Martin (2000) concluded that 
there seems to be a close link between objects that can be easily manipulated and information 
about the actions used on these objects in both the monkey and human brain.   
 
3.5. Canonical Neurons 
Canonical neurons are different from mirror neurons, although both are present in 
area F5.  Canonical neurons discharge during the observation of graspable objects and during 
the grasping of objects.  It has been proposed that canonical neurons play an important role in 
object-to-hand movement transformations, and this effect was observed in the study by Chao 
and Martin (2000).  Mirror neurons, on the other hand, respond both when a monkey 
performs an action and when a monkey observes another individual performing a similar 
action (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Gallese, 1996).  Rizzolatti et al. (1996) proposed, based 
on these findings, that mirror neurons play an important role in the imitation and 
understanding of actions. 
 
3.6. Category-Specific Brain Activations for Words 
Category-specific brain activations have been observed not only when people view 
pictures of tools and animals, but also when they view tool and animal words.  Chao, Haxby 
and Martin, (1999) found consistent, category-related activation in ventral (fusiform gyrus) 
and lateral (superior and middle temporal gyri) regions of the posterior temporal lobes when 
participants viewed and named pictures of animals and tools.  Similar patterns of activity also 
occurred when participants read the names of, and answered questions about, animals and 
tools.  Devlin, Rushworth, and Matthews (2005) found category-related brain activations in 
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the posterior fusiform gyri when participants viewed words referring to man-made and 
natural items, suggesting that both the “bottom-up” processing of images and the “top-down” 
processing of words can cause category-related activation. 
Preissl, Pulvermüller, Lutzenberger, and Birbaumer (1995) recorded the 
electrocortical correlates of the processing of nouns and verbs of healthy participants 
performing lexical decisions.  The data recorded found different topographies of cortical 
activity for nouns and verbs.  They found that the differences between event-related brain 
potentials were due to stronger motor associations elicited by verbs.  Preissl et al. (1995) 
concluded that the neural generators of nouns and verbs are distinct and that these generators 
involve areas outside of the classic language centers of Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas.   
Pulvermüller, Lutzenberger, and Preissl (1999) also investigated the processing of 
concrete nouns and verbs using three different measures: (i) behavioral measures, (ii) 
stimulus-triggered event-related potentials and (iii) high-frequency electrocortical responses 
in the gamma band (p. 497).  Participants performed a lexical decision task while 
electrocortical responses were recorded.  The response times of participants were also 
recorded, and participants also completed questionnaires.  Pulvermüller et al. (1999) found 
that in as little as ~200 msec after the onset of the stimulus, event-related potentials showed 
electrocortical differences between nouns and verbs over widespread cortical areas (p. 497).  
They found strong between-category differences of signals recorded above motor and visual 
cortices.  The results from the behavioral data collected suggest that the physiological 
responses are related to visual or motor semantic associations elicited by the word groups.  
They concluded that nouns referring to objects include neurons in visual cortices, and action 
verbs include neurons in motor, premotor, and prefrontal cortices (Pulvermüller et al., 1999, 
p. 497).  These studies provide evidence for differential processing of verbs and nouns in the 
brain, and more interestingly, differential processing of objects used by the hands.  The 
selective activity in a premotor region of the brain when viewing tools observed in the study 
by Martin et al. (1996) indicate that objects that can be manipulated (e.g. tools) are processed 
in the context of action.  The physiological differences observed in the brain between the 
processing of verbs in comparison to nouns provides evidence that words can also activate 
the same regions in the brain as visually viewing objects or performing actions.   
Reading words can also cause motor resonances in parts of the body that correspond 
semantically to those words (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008).  A study by Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, 
and Ilmoniemi (2005b) used high-density magnetoencephalography to record participants 
performing a distracter task while listening to words that denoted actions involving the leg or 
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face.  Once words could be recognized as unique lexical items, activation was recorded in the 
superior temporal and inferior frontocentral areas.  The superior central sites were more 
activated from the leg-related action words while the inferior frontocentral areas were more 
strongly activated by the face-related action words. These results suggest that semantic access 
in action word recognition is an early automatic process that can be observed in 
spatiotemporal signatures of word-evoked activity (Pulvermüller et al., 2005b, p. 884).  
Pulvermüller et al. (2005b) hypothesized that mirror neurons in different parts of the 
frontocentral cortex that may include the prefrontal, premotor and motor areas contribute 
differentially to the semantic processing of action words (p. 889).  These mirror neurons are 
involved in both the execution of actions and in the perceptual processes triggered by action 
words.  This study provides evidence that the mirror neurons that were observed in the 
monkey brain when they performed or observed actions (Rizzolatti et al., 1996) are also 
discharging in the human brain when they view words pertaining to actions.   
If motor and premotor areas are activated merely by reading a word, is it also the case 
that motor and premotor areas could activate the language centers of the brain that 
semantically represent the corresponding action words (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008)?  Is it a two-
way connection?  Another study by Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, and Iimoniemi (2005a) 
found that indeed the relationship does travel the other direction in that stimulation of the 
motor areas of the brain helps with lexical decisions of action words. 
Pulvermüller and colleagues (2005a) measured response times when applying 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to motor areas in the left language-dominant 
hemisphere while right-handed participants made lexical decisions on words related to 
actions.  They found that “TMS of hand and leg areas influenced the processing of arm-
related action words and leg-related action words differentially” (Pulvermüller et al., 2005a, 
p. 793).  TMS of the arm area led to faster arm than leg word responses and TMS of the leg 
area led to faster lexical decisions on leg than arm words6
 
.  Pulvermüller et al. (2005a) 
concluded from their results that “left hemispheric cortical systems for language and action 
are linked to each other in a category-specific manner and that activation in motor and 
premotor areas can influence the processing of specific kinds of words semantically related to 
arm or leg actions” (p. 793).   
                                                     
6 In the control conditions, there were no TMS-related differences. The control conditions included sham 




Effects of the Hands on Vision and Language 
 
4.1. Vision and the Hands 
Our hands play an important role in our visual perception.  Visual processes that do 
not inherently involve the hands have been found to be affected by the hands (Davoli et al., 
2010).  Bekkering and Neggers (2002) investigated the influence of action intentions on 
visual selection processes within a visual search paradigm.  A predefined target object that 
had a certain color and orientation was presented among a number of distracter objects.  
Participants either pointed or grasped the target object while looking at it.  Bekkering and 
Neggers (2002) measured eye movements and found that “target selection processes prior to 
the first saccadic eye movement were modulated by the different action intentions” (p. 370).  
More specifically, the first eye movement was more accurate in selecting the correctly-
orientated object in the grasping condition than in the pointing condition7
Reed, Grubb, and Steele (2006) investigated whether the presence of the hand in 
peripersonal space can modulate the distribution of visuospatial attention and, if so, which 
attentional mechanisms (shifting location or prioritization of space) were most affected (p. 
168).  The experiments used a visual covert attention paradigm and had highly predictive 
.  The results 
indicate that the action to be performed can enhance visual processing of action-related 
properties of objects, such as object orientation.  Fagioli, Hommel, and Schubotz (2007) 
investigated whether the reverse was also true: that activating action systems primes the 
processing of stimuli defined on perceptual dimensions related to these actions (p. 22).  In a 
reversal of the Bekkering and Neggers (2002) experimental paradigm, participants prepared 
to perform either a reaching or grasping action, and prior to carrying it out, were presented 
with size or location-defined stimulus events.  Fagioli and colleagues (2007) found that 
planning a reaching action caused facilitation for detecting deviants in location sequences, 
while planning a grasping action caused facilitation for detecting deviants in size sequences.  
These results reflect an overlap between grasping actions and object properties as well as 
reaching actions and spatial properties, supporting the findings of Rizzolatti et al. (1988) and 
Hoshi and Tanji (2002) that monkeys and humans possess canonical neurons that exhibit 
significant activity during observation of target location and during reaching.  
                                                     
7 The number of saccades to an object of the wrong color was the same in both conditions.   
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cues.  Participants had to detect a visual target that could appear in one of two locations8
Reed and colleagues found that participants detected targets appearing near the hand 
more quickly than targets appearing away from the hand, regardless of cue validity.  This 
hand-related facilitation effect suggests that having the hand near the target prioritized the 
space near the hand for attentional processing.  The effect was hand-specific, in that having 
another object in place of the hand such as a board did not cause facilitation.  The positioning 
of a fake hand was, however, sufficient to produce a facilitation effect.  Reed et al. (2006) 
found a stronger facilitation effect when the hands were closer to the target than away from 
the target, although the effect was still present when the hands were farther away
.  
Participants responded when the target appeared at either the validly cued location, or the 
invalidly cued location.  Participants “placed either their right hand next to the right-side 
target location or their left hand next to the left-side target location and made their detection 
responses with the other hand” (Reed et al., 2006, p. 169).  The first experiment explored 
whether there was an effect of hand presence on spatial attention.  The second ruled out the 
possibility that any arbitrary visual anchor changes the distribution of spatial attention.  The 
third and fourth experiments selectively minimized proprioceptive-kinesthetic information 
regarding hand location, and the fifth experiment explored whether there was a decrease in 
attentional effects when the hand was farther from the visual target.   
9
Objects near the hands may be processed in an entirely different way from those 
farther from the hands.  Abrams, Davoli, Du, Knapp, and Paull (2008) explored the 
relationship between hand position and visual processing.  Three classic visual attention tasks 
were used: visual search, inhibition of return, and attentional blink.  During the visual search 
task, participants had to identify the letters H or S among other distracter letters.  The 
inhibition of return task involved responding to the location of a target after the presentation 
of a cue with varying intervals between cue and target.  During the attentional blink task, 
participants reported the parity of the first target (odd or even) and the identity of the second 
target (A or B) following a stream of characters.  Participants shifted their attention between 
stimuli more slowly when their hands were near the display, and the same results occurred 
when the hands were visible and invisible.  Abrams et al. (2008) hypothesized that this 
enhancement of vision near the hands could facilitate the detailed evaluation of objects to aid 
.  The hand 
appeared to increase the relative saliency of targets near the hand with a cost of processing 
targets that were farther from the hand (Reed et al., 2006, p. 174).   
                                                     
8 A highly predictive visual cue (70%) indicated the likelihood of the target appearing at that location.   
9 The effect also did not interact with cue validity or the shifting of spatial attention. 
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in object manipulation, or could aid in the assessment of potentially dangerous objects (p. 
1035).   
  Evidence from neuroscience also suggests that vision nearer to the body and 
specifically near the hands is processed differently.  Bimodal neurons with tactile receptive 
fields on the hand have been found in monkeys and these neurons respond to visual 
stimulation from objects close to the hand (Graziano, Hu, & Gross, 1997).  An fMRI study 
has also found regions of the human brain that generate activity when objects are close to the 
hand (Makin, Holmes, & Zohary, 2007).   
Vision can be so powerful on the perception of one’s hands that it can be used to treat 
patients with phantom limbs.  A famous study by Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran 
(1996) tested the effects of visual input on phantom limb sensations.  A new device called a 
“virtual reality box” was created that used inter-sensory effects to make the phantom limb 
appear visually by reflecting the patient’s intact hand.  A vertical mirror was placed on a table 
so that the reflection of the patient’s intact hand was “superimposed” on the felt position of 
the phantom (Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996, p. 377).  Patients reported 
precisely localized touch sensations in the phantom hand when the normal hand reflected in 
the mirror was touched.   
 
4.2. Effects of the Hands on Semantic Processing 
The evidence for altered vision near the hands could have implications for reading.  
Reading is typically performed by holding a piece of paper or a book in one’s hands.  More 
recently, with the advent of computers, it has become common to read off of a computer 
screen with one’s hands farther away.  Despite this change, many people prefer to print more 
important documents that they truly want to absorb rather than read them off of the screen 
(Davoli et al., 2010).  According to an informal poll conducted by Davoli and colleagues 
(2010), the vast majority of people, rather than stating any functional advantages to printing 
reading material, simply state that they “just like to hold it,” as if to imply that holding the 
text in one’s hands alters reading in some fundamental way (p. 555).   
 
4.3. The Study by Davoli et al. (2010) 
To investigate the effects of the hands on reading, Davoli and colleagues (2010) 
conducted several experiments.  Davoli et al. (2010) attempted to test the effects of the hands 
on semantic processing.  Participants held different hand postures during the experiments so 
29 
 
that their hands were closer or farther from the screen, and therefore, the text.  In the first 
experiment, participants read sentences and made judgments on their sensibleness.  A 
nonsensical sentence was defined as following the conventions of English grammar but 
containing one word that did not belong based in the context of the sentence.  For example, 
the sentence Tim carried his suitcase to the car would be a sensible sentence, but Tim typed 
his suitcase to the car would be nonsensical.  Therefore, according to Davoli et al. (2010), 
participants had to judge the semantic content of each sentence.  Two different hand posture 
conditions were used.  In the proximal condition, participants held their hands out to the 
screen and rested their arms on a pillow.  They entered their answers using two response 
buttons mounted to each side of the monitor.  During the distal condition, participants held a 
lightweight board in their laps.  Response buttons were fixed to the board and participants 
held one hand on each button.  Participants were significantly poorer at classifying the 
nonsensical sentences correctly during the proximal condition than during the distal 
condition.   
 The second experiment by Davoli and colleagues (2010) employed a task to measure 
the Stroop interference effect (Stroop, 1935) for proximal and distal hand postures.  The 
Stroop interference effect is a cognitive phenomenon in which a color word (e.g. RED) 
interferes with the color in which it appears when the color (e.g. blue) is incongruent with the 
meaning (Davoli et al., 2010, p. 558).  Davoli et al. (2010) stated that this reflects the relative 
speed at which words are read and therefore is a good test for semantic processing.  They 
expected to find a reduced Stroop interference effect if the hands were near the color words 
due to impoverished semantic processing.  Results showed that the magnitude of the Stroop 
interference effect was dramatically reduced when the hands were near the text in the 
proximal condition, thus supporting their hypothesis.   
Davoli and colleagues (2010) described two confounding variables.  One was that 
instead of impoverished semantic processing, the reduced effect found when the hands were 
near the display could be caused by impoverished color processing.  It was also possible that 
the proximal posture was less comfortable and less natural, and as a result caused slower 
processing.  Davoli et al. (2010) conducted a third experiment to address these issues.  In the 
third experiment, the distal posture was replaced with a different distal posture as awkward 
and unusual as the proximal posture.  This experiment did not find any neutral trial difference 
between the proximal and distal conditions, suggesting that there is no impoverished color 
processing effect.  Participants continued to have a reduced Stroop interference effect in the 




4.4. Conclusions of Davoli et al. (2010) Study 
Davoli et al. (2010) provided two explanations for their results.  The reduction in 
semantic processing could be due to the presence of a trade-off between semantic processing 
and spatial processing that occurs when one’s hands are close to text.  Perhaps visual 
processing near the hands is biased towards the spatial properties of objects and away from 
semantic ones (Davoli et al., 2010, p. 560).  This bias towards spatial properties of objects 
could be important for object manipulation and avoidance of dangerous objects.  An 
alternative explanation is that the differences in the tasks can be attributed to enhanced 
cognitive control near the hands.  For example, performing the Stroop task requires the 
suppression of one’s automatic response to read the word and instead attend to the color of 
the word.  This process relies heavily on cognitive control.  A study by Koch, Holland, 
Hengstler, and van Knippenberg (2009) found a large reduction in Stroop interference when 
participants took a step backwards before performing the task, but not when they took steps 
forward or to the side.  Koch et al. (2009) explained that the step backwards may have 
induced an avoidance mindset.  In an avoidance mindset it would be beneficial to have 
increased cognitive control.  It could also be the case that the practice some people have with 
reading in a particular medium outweighs any effects due to hand posture.  Davoli and 
colleagues (2010) concluded that further research is needed to determine the most appropriate 
explanation (p. 561).   
 
4.5. Problems with the Davoli et al. (2010) Study 
Davoli and colleagues (2010) conducted an exciting and novel study investigating the 
effects of hand posture on semantics.  However, the tasks used to measure semantic 
processing were problematic.  The task used in the first experiment involved judging 
sentences on their sensibleness.  This task did not take into account that participants may 
have misunderstood what was implied by “sensibleness” and could have considered any 
sentence that was grammatically correct as being sensible, thus providing an incorrect 
answer.   
 The use of the Stroop task as a measure of semantic processing is also problematic.  
Despite decades of research, theoretical explanations of the Stroop interference effect are 
inadequate, and the cause of the effect still remains unclear (MacLeod, 1991).  Without a 
clear theoretical understanding of the Stroop interference effect, it becomes difficult to isolate 
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the role of semantics.  Semantic processing can be measured more directly with a semantic 
categorization task.  In this simple task, participants must respond to whether a word fits 
within a given category.  Semantic categorization tasks can be constructed in a variety of 
ways (see Ota, Hartsuiker, & Haywood, 2010; Renoult & Debruille, 2010 for some 
examples) for different experimental paradigms.  The tasks also allow for exclusion criteria.  
For example, if a participant only gets 50% of the answers to the questions correct, their data 
can be excluded from the experiment.  The Stroop task, on the other hand, lacks exclusion 
criteria.  There may be no Stroop interference effect for one participant and a very strong 
Stroop interference effect found for another, but there is no way to be sure if the participant 
that did not have the effect had a different understanding of the word meanings.  Perhaps they 
were distracted, or had increased cognitive control.  Davoli et al. (2010) had trouble drawing 
conclusions from the Stroop task.  It was difficult to determine if the effect was caused by 
impoverished color processing, increased cognitive control, or impoverished semantic 
processing.  These confounding variables would be controlled for if a semantic categorization 







In this experiment, I tested the hypothesis by Davoli et al. (2010) that that semantic 
processing was reduced if the hands were near text when reading.  Instead of using the 
sensibleness task or Stroop task employed by Davoli et al. (2010), participants completed a 
semantic categorization task and a visual task, in a proximal and distal hand posture.  The 
semantic categorization task assessed the effects of posture on speed of semantic processing, 
while the visual task acted as a control for the effects of posture on response time.  There 
were six different word categories within the semantic categorization task: tools, animals, 
vegetables, fruit, flowers, and buildings.   
I hypothesized that a reduction in semantic processing would occur when the hands 
were near the display, in line with the results of Davoli et al. (2010).  If the tasks employed 
by Davoli et al. (2010) did indeed represent a reduction in semantic processing when the 
hands were near text, then participants would perform more slowly on the semantic 
categorization task when the hands were close to the display.  If, however, Davoli and 
colleagues (2010) did not accurately test the effects of the hands on semantic processing, then 
I would expect to find no effect of the hands on semantic processing.   
Following the semantic categorization task, participants completed a visual task.  
Participants responded to a word appearing on the screen as quickly as possible.  The task did 
not involve semantic processing, and was used as a control task for the effects of hand 
posture on response times.  It was predicted that if the proximal hand posture was more 
uncomfortable than the distal hand posture, then participants would perform more slowly in 
the proximal hand posture than the distal hand posture.   
 
5.2. Methodology  
5.2.1. Participants 
Twenty-four participants between18 and 38 years of age were recruited through the 
University of Edinburgh’s Student and Graduate Employment website (SAGE)10
                                                     
10 A total of 29 participants were recruited, but the data of five participants was not used due to technical 
difficulties with the game controllers. 
.  The 
participants were compensated with £5 for participating.  Half of the participants were male 
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 Six different word categories were used for the semantic categorization task.   Ten 
words from each category were presented in the first half of the experiment and ten in the 
second half, totaling 20 words for each category.  The categories were animals, tools, fruit, 
vegetables, flowers, and buildings. These category words were matched with control words 
for letter and syllable length.  The words had an average letter length of 6.34 and an average 
syllable length of 2.02. The words were also matched as much as possible for Kucera-Francis 
number of samples frequency (Kucera & Francis, 1967) and concreteness rating (Coltheart, 
1981).  The category and matched control words had an average frequency of 11.24 and an 
average concreteness rating of 590.48.  In total, there were 240 words presented in the 
experiment; 120 words related to a semantic category and 120 non-related matched control 
words (see Appendix A).  The groups of 20 category words with their matched controls were 
randomly divided in half so that half of the words could be presented in the first half of the 
experiment in the first posture position and half presented in the second posture position.  The 
words were categorized by five native British English speakers to ensure that there was 
consensus that the words fit into their designated category and that the control words were 
not classified as category words by mistake.  The word categories were presented in a 
randomized order and the category words were pseudo-randomized with the control words so 
that no more than four words of the same type (category word or control word) would appear 
in a row.  This was done to prevent any confounding effects caused by the presentation of too 
many category words (or control words), which could cause participants to expect a word of 
the other type to soon occur, influencing their responsiveness.   
The computer program E-Prime was used for presenting the tasks and for recording 
the response times of the participants.  Participants used game controllers to enter their 
responses.  One game controller was mounted to the bottom of the computer monitor with 
Blu-Tack and the other was loose.   
 
5.2.3. Apparatus  
Participants sat at a desk facing a computer screen and rested their chin on a chinrest.  




                         
Figure 1. The picture on the left shows the proximal posture.  The hands are resting on the 
game controller fastened to the bottom of the screen. The picture on the right shows the distal 
posture, in which participants held a separate game controller in their lap.     
 
participants used the game controller fastened to the bottom of the screen and rested their 
arms on a pillow, and during the distal posture, participants used the loose game controller 
which they held in their laps (see Figure 1).  Their hands and the game controller were not in 
their field of vision in the distal posture condition.   
 
5.2.4. Design 
 This study compared the response times for participants completing a semantic 
categorization task and a visual task.  The study used a within subjects 2 x 2 factorial design 
with two posture conditions and two different word lists.  There were two posture conditions: 
the proximal posture condition in which the game counsel was held next to the screen so that 
the hands were near the text on the screen, and the distal posture in which the game counsel 
was held in the participant’s lap.  Participants performed half of the semantic categorization 
task in the proximal posture and half in the distal posture and the posture order was 
counterbalanced across subjects.  The order of the word lists was also counterbalanced across 
subjects so that half of the participants received the first word list in the first half of the 
experiment and half received the first word list in the second half of the experiment.  The 
visual task had the same design.  Participants who performed the distal posture in the first 
half of the semantic categorization task also performed the distal posture in the first half of 
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the visual task.  Halfway through the visual task participants changed to the other posture. 
Three male and three female participants completed each version of the experiment.   
The experiment was designed to have two go/no-go tasks (Gomez, Ratcliff, & Perea, 
2007) in which participants responded when a category word appeared during the semantic 
categorization task or when the word “press” appeared during the visual task, but did not 
respond when a control word or no “press” word appeared.  There were practice blocks 
before both the semantic categorization task and the visual task so that participants could be 
familiarized with using the game controller and responding to the words.   
 
5.2.5. Procedure 
 Participants read an information sheet explaining that they would be asked to 
complete a word categorization task and a visual task and enter their responses using game 
controllers (see Appendix B).  They were also asked to fill in an informed consent form (see 
Appendix C).  Then the experimenter adjusted the chinrest and explained how to enter 
responses using the game controller by demonstrating which buttons should be pressed and 
that they should be pressed using the pointer finger from each hand.  Participants were 
instructed to push down with a finger from each hand at the same time to control for any 
hemispheric effects.  The experimenter ensured that the participants were using the correct 
posture the first time that they were asked to perform each posture by helping them assume 
the correct posture at the beginning of the experiment and then asking the participant to call 
them back into the booth when they had to change the other posture for the first time.   
The semantic categorization task was presented first.  Participants were given 
instructions that a question word would appear and that they should press down the buttons if 
the following word fit into the category prompted by the question word.  If the word did not 
fit into the prompted category, they were instructed to not press the buttons and wait for the 
next word to appear.  The question word was the name of one of the categories, and was 
presented in capital letters followed by a question mark, such as “ANIMAL?” (Prévost et al., 
2010).  Participants had to press both buttons down on the game controller in order to start 
the word list.  The screen was blank for 1,000 msec.  A fixation cross then appeared on the 
screen for 500 msec and either a category word or a control word would appear for 1,500 
msec.  If the participant pushed down either button or both buttons with their fingers, the 
word would disappear immediately and the blank screen for 1,000 msec and fixation cross for 
500 msec would again appear.  This word would be logged as receiving a “go” response.  
Therefore, even if a participant did not succeed at pressing down both buttons using both 
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fingers, the word would still be logged as a “go” response, controlling for any difficulties the 
participant may have had in pressing down the buttons.  If no buttons were pressed, it was 
logged as a “no-go” response.   
Participants first completed a practice block of 24 words, four from each category 
(two category words and two control words).  The experimental block followed.  After 
completing 20 category and control words from each of the six categories, participants were 
asked to change posture and the experimenter was called in to help them with the new 
posture.  Then they completed 20 new category and control words from each of the six 
categories in the new posture.  After the semantic categorization task, participants were asked 
to complete the visual task.  They changed posture once again prior to beginning the visual 
task.  Participants were instructed to press down on both buttons on the game controller when 
they saw the word “press” appear.  The word “press” appeared on the screen at a random time 
between 500 and 1,500 msec three out of every four trials, and for one out of four trials the 
no word appeared11
 
.  The order of the trials was randomized so that it was not predictable 
when the word “press” would not appear.  Participants completed a practice block of 12 trials 
and then completed 32 trials in the first posture and 32 trials in the second posture.  After the 
visual task participants were debriefed about the experiment and were given a debrief form to 
take home (see Appendix D).  Participants were paid £5 and signed a confirmation form 
stating that they received the money. 
 
 
                                                     
11 The word “press” only appeared three out of every four trials to keep participants from pressing the buttons 






The mean response time for proximal and distal hand postures for the semantic 
categorization task are shown in Figure 2.  A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-design analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was used to compare gender (male or female), which posture participants received 
first (proximal or distal), and the difference in response time between the two posture 
conditions for the semantic categorization task (proximal and distal).  No significant 
difference was found for posture, F(1,20) = .375, p = .547.  The average response time for the 
proximal condition (M = 666.59 msec, SD = 21.40) was hardly different from the distal 
condition (M = 660.04 msec, SD = 21.09).  There was a significant difference for gender, 
with females (M = 617.40 msec, SD = 29.08) performing slightly faster than males (M = 





Figure 2. The mean response times (in milliseconds) for the proximal and distal hand postures 
for the semantic categorization task.  No significant difference was found between the two 




   
38 
 
                    Hand Posture__________    
                      Proximal      Distal 
Word 
Category      M      SD     M     SD 
Fruits 605.5 119 617.8 117.2 
Animals 622.1 129.5 581.8 89.3 
Tools 717.5 120.4 748.9 152.1 
Vegetables 669.8 134.9 663.1 136.2 
Flowers 678.7 123.7 662.8 167.9 
Buildings 707.2 124.1 690.9 96.8 
  
 
Table 1. The mean response times (in milliseconds) and standard deviations for each word 
category for the proximal and distal postures.  Response times for tool words were the 
slowest, while response times for fruit and animal words were fastest.   
 
A 6 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the six different word 
categories (fruits, animals, tools, vegetables, flowers, and buildings) and the response times 
between the two posture conditions (proximal and distal).  There was a strong main effect for 
the word categories, F(5,20) = 28.80, p ˂ .0005 and an interaction effect between the word 




Figure 3.  The mean response times (in milliseconds) for each word category in the proximal 
and distal postures.  Response times for tool words were faster in the proximal posture than in 





Post-hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction found significance for many of the 
categories, including: fruits and flowers (p = .005), fruits and vegetables (p ˂ .0005), fruits 
and buildings (p ˂ .0005), animals and vegetables (p = .001), animals and flowers (p = .010), 
and animals and buildings (p ˂ .0005).  The means and standard deviations for each category 
are listed in Table 1. Response times for tool words were strongly significant (p ˂ .0005) in 
comparison to every other category except building words, which was insignificant (p = 
.481).  Participants’ response times for tool words were much slower than for all other word 
categories (see Figure 3).  Participants were slightly faster when responding to the tool words 
when their hands were in the proximal posture (M = 717.49 msec, SD = 120.43) than in the 
distal posture (M = 748.86 msec, SD = 152.06), but this was not significant because the main 
effect for posture was not found to be significant.  Response times for fruit words were 
slightly faster in the proximal condition (M = 605.47 msec, SD = 119.00) than the distal 
condition (M = 617.75 msec, SD = 117.22).  Response times for animal words were slower in 
the proximal condition (M = 622.06 msec, SD = 129.55) than the distal condition (M = 
581.83 msec, SD = 89.32), but once again, this was not significant due to no significant main 




Figure 4. The mean response times (in milliseconds) for proximal and distal postures for the 
visual task.  Response times for the proximal posture were significantly slower than for the 






To analyze the visual task, a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-design ANOVA was used that compared 
gender (male or female), which posture participants received first (proximal or distal), and 
the difference in response time between the two posture conditions (proximal and distal).  A 
significant effect was found for posture, F(1,20) = 12.993, p = .002.  Participants were 
slightly slower at the visual task when their hands were in the proximal posture (see Figure 










Contrary to Davoli et al. (2010), there was no effect from the hands on semantic 
processing.  Participants were not slower when their hands were nearer to the display during 
the semantic categorization task, in fact, response times were almost exactly the same.  The 
speed of response time for the different word categories was strongly significant.  This 
difference in response time could be attributable to higher amounts of exposure to certain 
word categories over others.  Participants may have been more familiar with animal and fruit 
words because they had more exposure to them.  The concreteness of the words could also 
have been an influencing factor.  The tool and building word categories had lower 
concreteness ratings than the other word categories (M = 582.03, SD = 14.96 and M = 
571.92, SD = 10.11 respectively).  Participants were fastest at responding to fruits and animal 
words, slower at responding to vegetable and flower words, and slowest at responding to 
building and tool words.  Interestingly, response times for tool words were faster in the 
proximal condition, but post hoc tests could not be used due to the lack of a main effect for 
hand posture.  Considering evidence of canonical neurons that discharge when monkeys and 
humans view graspable objects, and the motor resonances found by Martin et al. (1996) when 
participants viewed pictures of tools, there could be an effect of the hands on the speed of 
semantic processing for graspable objects.  Four out of the six word categories used could be 
considered graspable objects: tools, fruits, vegetables, and flowers.  Out of these word 
categories, tool words tend to have the strongest association with the hands.  This association 
could have caused a facilitation effect when the hands were in the proximal position.   
Response times for fruit words were slightly faster in the proximal posture than the 
distal posture, but little difference was found for vegetables and flowers, which could imply 
that fruits and tools have a stronger association with the hands in comparison to vegetables 
and flowers.   
 Participants had slower response times in the proximal condition when performing the 
visual task. This was likely caused by the awkwardness of the proximal posture.  The fact that 
posture was significant for the visual task but was insignificant for the semantic 
categorization task seems to confirm that Davoli et al. (2010) did not measure semantic 
processing, and that the effect they observed may have been attributable to other factors such 
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as postural discomfort, an increase in cognitive control, impoverished color processing, or a 
misunderstanding of the sensibleness task.  One would expect that if it was less comfortable 
to have one’s hands in the proximal position, then participants would also perform more 
slowly with their hands near the display during the semantic categorization task as well.  This 
was not the case, which could imply that participants benefited from their hands near the text, 
and that this effect was diminished because of the awkwardness of the posture.  There could 
also be another explanation: fatigue.  All participants performed the visual task at the end of 
the experiment.  Because of this, it is possible that participants were merely more tired during 
the visual task, and that this fatigue effect was more pronounced in the proximal posture.    
 
7.2. Evaluation of the Experiment 
 The experimental apparatus was not a replication of the apparatus used by Davoli et 
al. (2010).  Rather than having boards with attached buttons mounted to the sides of the 
monitor and held in the participants’ laps, game controllers were used.  The use of game 
controllers may have given an advantage to participants familiar with video games, 
influencing their response time.  It is also likely that the comfort of holding the game 
controller in one’s lap, the way it is generally held when playing video games, had an 
influence on response times.  It would have been beneficial to have replicated the 
experimental apparatus used by Davoli et al. (2010) in order to control for any differences in 
response time caused by using game controllers.  With the same experimental apparatus, it 
would have been easier to compare the current experiment to that of Davoli et al. (2010), and 
gain a clearer understanding of the relationship between hand posture and semantic 
processing. 
 The visual task was always at the end of the experiment, which increased the 
likelihood that the results were due to fatigue.  Counterbalancing the order of the two tasks 
would help to control for this confounding variable.   
 
7.3. Theoretical Implications 
This experiment investigated whether the hands had a facilitating effect on semantic 
processing, or whether semantic processing had to compete for resources because of 
enhanced visual processing near the hands.  Generally, a facilitation effect from the use of the 
hands for linguistic processing has been observed in previous research.  Gestures, for 
example, are helpful in speech production (Marangolo et al., 2010), retrieving words from 
43 
 
memory, and reducing cognitive burden so that effort can be focused on other tasks (Goldin-
Meadow, 1999).  Gestures also allow learners access to new thoughts.  For example, children 
participating in science lessons frequently gesture to foreshadow the ideas that they later 
articulate into speech (Crowder, 1996).  Stimulation of motor areas in the brain that 
correspond to body parts can facilitate action-word responses that match those body parts in a 
lexical decision task (Pulvermüller et al., 2005a).  Getting primed with a word label on an 
object prior to performing an action can have an influence on the action (Gentilucci et al., 
2000), and this can facilitate responses if the word and the properties of the object are 
congruent.   The interconnectedness of language the motor system makes it highly plausible 
that the motor system is utilized by higher cognitive processes in a way that facilitates 
language processing.   
It is also possible that the hands compete with linguistic processing, as proposed by 
Davoli et al. (2010).  Gestures tend to benefit language processing, but these gestures are 
communicative.  Having one’s hands near text is not communicative, and is therefore likely 
to be represented differently in the brain.  Studies have shown that spatial processing is 
enhanced near the hands (Reed et al., 2006; Abrams et al., 2008), but it is difficult to 
determine the effects of this enhancement on language.  Alkadhi et al. (2005) recorded brain 
activation during motor imagery in paraplegic patients and healthy controls and found that 
the primary motor cortex was consistently activated, even to the same degree as the activation 
during movement execution in healthy controls.  This finding supports the claim that regions 
connected and indirectly connected to the spinal cord are actively suppressed in healthy 
controls during motor imagery to hinder activation of the motor apparatus (Alkadhi et al., 
2005, p. 138).  It seems, therefore, that some processes of active suppression on the motor 
system occur when there is abstraction away from the production of motor movements.  The 
active suppression of motor movements could be draining on cognition and reduce 
performance on other cognitive tasks.  The enhancement of motor imagery found for 
paraplegics implies that when the motor system is not capable of interfering, other cognitive 
processes become enhanced.  This could be extended to the results of the Davoli et al. (2010) 
study.  In the same way that paraplegics show an enhancement of motor imagery, the absence 
of the hands near the display could have enhanced semantic processing because the motor 
system was not competing for resources.   
An experiment by Boysen (1992) suggests that chimpanzees can benefit from abstract 
stimulus.  When chimpanzees viewed a plate of candies and matched the candies with a 
displayed Arabic numeral, they invariably pointed to the plate with more candies, regardless 
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of the numeral.  When the candies were replaced with marked placards symbolically 
representing the candies, the chimpanzees performed the task successfully.  The experiment 
suggests that abstraction away from an action-associated stimulus can aid in performance 
because it limits interference from the motor system.  It also highlights that there may be a 
very pronounced difference in the cognitive processing of real stimuli in comparison to 
symbolically represented stimuli.  Perhaps the processing of symbolically represented stimuli 
(e.g. words) does not benefit from the inclusion of the motor system because it causes 
interference.   
Facilitation from motor resonances occurs most when there is congruency between 
the affordance, picture, or word, and the action (Phillips & Ward, 2002; Gentilucci et al., 
2000; Glover, 2004).  It seems, therefore, that the motor system can facilitate symbolically 
represented stimuli, but that facilitation is contingent on the congruency between the stimuli 
and the motor response.  There may be no overall effect for semantic processing when the 
hands are close to text, but there could be category-specific facilitation.  Facilitation was 
found for the semantic processing of tool words when the hands were in the proximal posture, 
and this selective facilitation effect has been well-documented in previous studies of 
embodied cognition.  Semantic processing may be facilitated in the same way if the words 
being categorized concern the hands. 
 
7.4. Future Research 
 A better comparison between the Davoli et al. (2010) study and the current one could 
be made if the experimental apparatus used by Davoli et al. (2010) could be replicated.  An 
experiment with the same apparatus but with a semantic categorization task would control for 
any differences caused by using game controllers and would provide better evidence for an 
effect on semantic processing. 
In the third experiment by Davoli et al. (2010), they introduced an equally awkward 
distal hand posture.  The current experiment may have benefited from the addition of an 
awkward distal hand posture to help control for any awkwardness of the proximal posture.  If 
the awkwardness of posture were more controlled, it would be easier to conclude that an 
effect found in the proximal posture was caused by the presence of the hands near the text.  It 
would be important to continue to include the visual task, so that the effects of posture could 
be measured independently of semantic processing. 
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The faster response times found for the categorization of tool words in the proximal 
posture implies that there may be an advantage to having one’s hands closer to words that 
represent graspable objects.  Chao and Martin (2000) found that viewing tools selectively 
activated regions of the brain that store information on motor-based properties.  Studies by 
Chao, et al. (1999) and Devlin, et al. (2005) have found category-specific activation when 
participants read words, suggesting that both words and pictures cause category-specific 
motor area activation.  Grabowski, Damasio, and Damasio (1998) found category-specific 
premotor activation for tool words when participants performed word retrieval tasks.  This 
region was also activated when participants generated words for actions.  These studies 
suggest that tool words are processed uniquely, and that they are linked to areas of the brain 
used for action.  This connection to premotor areas associated with action could have caused 
the facilitation effect found for tool words when the hands were in the proximal posture.  
Further research is needed in order to determine if semantic processing of tool words (and 
possibly other graspable objects) are facilitated when one’s hands are close to the text.  A 
replication of the current experiment but with fewer categories, such as only tool and animal 
words, would help to isolate any category-specific facilitation effect.   
It would also be interesting to investigate the effects of hand posture on a 
categorization task involving pictures instead of words.   The unique brain activation that 
occurs in premotor areas when people view pictures of tools (Martin et al.,1996) suggests that 
the presence of the hands near pictures of tools could influence task performance.  Perhaps 
response times would be faster for categorizing pictures of tools in the proximal hand posture 
because of category-specific premotor activity.   
 
7.5. Conclusion 
The hands are intrinsically tied to language, through gestures, sign language and a 
mirror neuron system for grasping.  The connections discovered between the hands and 
higher level processing has led to the development of a new perspective within cognitive 
sciences: embodied cognition.  Embodied cognition emphasizes the importance of the hands 
by claiming that cognition is situated in the real-world environment and inherently involves 
perception and action.  The vast amount or research on motor resonance strengthens the 
evidence for this claim.  Studies have found motor resonance not only when people view 
actions or manipulable objects, but even for nouns and verbs.  The influence of the motor 
system extends to higher levels of cognition, and likely affects even semantic processing.   
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The current experiment investigated the influence of the hands on participants 
performing a semantic categorization task.  In contrast to Davoli et al. (2010), the proximity 
of the hands to the text had no effect on the speed of semantic processing.  It should not be 
concluded, therefore, that reduced semantic processing when one’s hands are close to the text 
is a robust effect, and further research is needed to clarify that a reduction in semantic 
processing does in fact occur.   
This study has important implications in a world in which computer screens are 
becoming the main medium for reading.  Many people report preferring to hold their reading 
material in their hands.  It remains unclear whether the presence of the hands causes 
competition for cognitive resources or provides facilitation for certain words or actions 
related to the hands.  Further research will help to clarify the extent to which the hands 
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The following words were used for the semantic categorization task. 
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Project Title: Semantic Categorization Task and Visual Task  
Principal Investigator: Nicole Miles (Masters student) 




What is the purpose of the project? 
I am investigating how people comprehend and categorize words.  There will first be a word 
categorization task, and then a short visual task. 
What will I have to do? 
There will be two tasks, a word categorization task and a visual task.  The first task will be 
the word categorization task.  A question word will appear and then a list of words will 
follow, appearing one after another.  You will be asked to press buttons on the front of a 
game controller when you see a word that fits into the category of the question word.   
For example, a question word such as “PLANT?” may appear.  Following this question word, 
plant words and non-plant words will appear, and you will be instructed to press the buttons 
on the game controller when you see a plant word.  If a non-plant word appears, you will be 
instructed to not press any buttons and wait until the next word appears.  For example, if the 
word “ivy” appears, you should press the buttons, but if the word “duck” appears, you should 
not. 
The second task is a visual task.  When the word “press” appears you will be asked to press 
both buttons on the front of the game controller. 
There will be several opportunities to take a break during the experiment. The experiment 
will take 50 minutes or less, and you will be paid £5. 
If you have any questions then please ask the experimenter now, or during one of the breaks 
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questions I have received satisfactory answers. 
 
 
I understand I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give a 
reason for withdrawing, and without prejudice. 
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1. What was the purpose of the project? 
I would ask you not to discuss the experiment with friends who might take part in it, at least till 
after they have completed the experiment – if you tell them about the task it may interfere with 
the results, as explained below. 
 
In this experiment I am investigating if having one’s hands near text influences semantic 
processing of words (our understanding of the meaning of words).  Previous research that used 
a different task found that having one’s hands near text causes a reduction in the speed of 
semantic processing.  I am testing to see if the same effect is found when doing a word 
categorization task.  I will compare the reaction times of participants holding their hands near 
the screen to holding their hands in their laps. 
 
This research could have interesting implications now that it is more common for people to read 
information off of a screen rather than on paper.   
 
2. How will I find out about the results? 
A summary of the results will be emailed to you within a few weeks of completion of the study, 
if you provided your email address. 
 
 
3. What will happen to the information I have provided? 
Your data will be stored safely, it will remain confidential and it will be destroyed after at most 
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The results of the study may be presented at conferences or published in academic journals but 
that data will be generalised – your personal information or data will not be identifiable, just the 
general patterns of performance across all our participants. 
 
5. Have I been deceived in any way during the project? 
Yes, in a very minor way.  You were not told about changing hand postures until necessary and 
you were not told exactly what was being measured in order to avoid any extra focus on your 
hands near the text.   
 
6. If I change my mind and wish to withdraw the information I have provided, how do I 
do this? 
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